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I.  Introduction
Civil society, trade unionists and many politicians have stressed the negative social conse-
quences of globalisation. Indeed, the increasing openness of developing countries has not 
been accompanied by a rapid improvement in labour standards. Reports from the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) and other official reports2 reveal the persistence or the 
deterioration of the worst forms of exploitation, like child and forced labour. According to 
the ILO, more than 12% of the world’s children aged between 5 and 9 are at work. The per-
centage rises to 23% for children from 10 to 14. 
Faced with these facts, a demand for the respect of minimal labour standards in trade has 
arisen in international, regional or national caucuses. For the economist Jagdish Bhagwati 
(2001), the problem with this “altruistic” demand is not that it reflects protectionist purposes 
but that a trade labour linkage, in the form of a Social Clause at the WTO, would not do the 
job. By making market access conditional to the respect of a set of minimal labour standards, 
such clauses would create two problems: first they would legitimate the use of trade sanc-
tions as the way to improve standards and secondly they would promote the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as the international institution in charge of the job. This opinion calls 
however for some discussion. First, theory, literature and facts may explain and, sometimes, 
justify the “demand” for a trade labour linkage solely using economic arguments without 
referring to moral arguments (Vasquez, 2001). Second, negative trade sanctions are not the 
only measures enhancing labour standards: pressures from government or civil society, 
“positive” incentives, and international aid are other means of improving labour standards. 
Thirdly, although the ILO is the qualified institution to deal with labour issues, the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO) is not excluded as long as labour standards are a matter of con-
cern for trade. Today, labour standards are excluded from multilateral negotiations, but they 
are frequently mentioned in bilateral (including in the Generalized System of Preference) 
and regional trade agreements, which confirm the importance of the issue. Thus, keeping the 
WTO out of the picture might jeopardize the multilateral system.
Section I shows how the world institutional system prevents the adoption of labour stand-
ards at the multilateral level, but makes it possible at the bilateral or regional level. Section 
II discusses the existence of a trade-labour linkage and the expected effects of core labour 
standards on trade. Section III gives some empirical results concerning this trade-labour 
linkage. We conclude in section IV.
II.  The social clause in international agreements 
During the 1980s, developed countries were challenged by competition from low-wage coun-
tries. This encouraged the resurgence of the debate about harmful low labour standards. The 
trade-labour linkage was explicitly put forward during the Uruguay Round (1986-1993).
The Marrakech Agreement dropped this debate, however, because of a lack of consensus 
among countries. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on December 13, 1996, 
confirmed the absence of consensus among the members of the two-year old World Trade 
Organization. As a consequence, the trade-labour linkage was denied; the ILO was recog-
nized as the only relevant organization to tackle labour standards, which are not a matter of 
concern for the WTO, beyond a simple “collaboration” between the two organizations. 
However, the “social clause” debate is not over. Many preferential agreements, such as the 
Generalized System of Preference (GSP), incorporate a “social clause”, which is frequently 
anchored to the labour standards regarded as fundamental by the ILO. 
III. A WTO without a social clause
The WTO legal framework largely enables its members to choose the political and economic 
systems they want. National sovereignty is respected thanks to the consensus rule (Raustalia 
[2003]). This has prevented the inclusion of any explicit reference to core labour standards 
in the Marrakech Agreements.
However, the Havana Charter of 1947, article 7, laid down a link between international 
trade and labour standards. It considered that workers’ rights violations were an international 
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issue: “The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take fully into 
account the rights of workers under inter-governmental declarations, conventions and agree-
ments. They recognize that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and main-
tenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages 
and working conditions as productivity may permit. The Members recognize that unfair labour 
conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, 
accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to elimi-
nate such conditions within its territory.”
The explicit trade-labour linkage was abandoned with the failure of the Havana Charter rati-
fication process. An International Trade Organization had not been created and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was used as a substitute. This agreement tackles 
only one aspect of rights at work: the products of prison labour (GATT; article XX e).
Developing countries did not adopt a strategy consisting in exchanging a social clause 
against other provisions, such as the opening of North markets to South agricultural exports. 
On the other hand, developed countries preferred to exchange the gradual extinction of the 
multi-fibre agreement for the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
and gave up the idea of introducing a trade-labour linkage in the final agreement3.
IV.  An ILO without trade leverage
The Singapore Compromise (1996) always gives the multilateral position. Core labour stan-
dards concern only ILO conventions. They have the legal statute of international agreements 
only when individual members ratify them.
In 1995, the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development defined a set of “funda-
mental” workers’ rights, based on International Labour Conventions. In June 1998, a new 
step was taken. The International Labour Conference adopted the “ILO Declaration on 
fundamental principles and rights at work”, which requires member countries to respect, 
promote and put into practice the fundamental rights: “[The International Labour Confer- the fundamental rights: “[The International Labour Confer- [The International Labour Confer-
ence]…Declares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in ques-
tion, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization, to 
respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the 
3  See also the comparison between the TRIPS and the labour standards or other regulatory issues in Maskus (2002). The author 
sees the protection of intellectual property rights in the WTO as an argument for including competition rules. The case would 
be weaker for environmental regulation and core labour standards. See another opinion in Thomas (2002).
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principles concerning the fundamental rights”. The eight fundamental conventions tackle 
four fields: freedom of association and right to collective bargaining (conventions 87 and 
98), prohibition of forced labour (conventions 29 and 105), prohibition of discrimination 
at work (conventions 100 and 111) and minimum age for child labour and worst forms of 
exploitation (convention 138 and 182). 
It should be noted that minimum wages, safety requirements, work time, unemployment 
compensation, social security and pension plans are not included in the ILO core labour 
standards.
Even if the “ILO Declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work” (1998) creates 
an obligation for member countries to respect fundamental rights, the ILO’s ability to sanc-  the ILO’s ability to sanc-
tion countries is largely symbolical even if article 33 authorizes the organization to take 
action against country members that do not comply with the recommendations of a Commis-
sion of Inquiry established to examine violations of ILO Conventions.
The core labour standards issue is paradoxical. Even though the post-war trade system is 
formally multilateral, social clauses are mainly included in regional or bilateral trade agree-
ments, which introduce constraints on internal institutional choices in terms of human rights, 
democracy, social laws and market economy.
It is easier to obtain a consensus among a small number of countries than among the 148 
WTO members. However, “clubs” are also built around common values. They introduce a 
political conditionality and sometimes organize significant transfers of sovereignty, such as 
in the European Union.
Some international commodity agreements contain labour considerations, even though they 
tend to be bashful. For example, article 40 of the International Coffee Agreement (2001) 
stipulates that “Members shall give consideration to improving the standard of living and 
working conditions of populations engaged in the coffee sector, consistent with their stage 
of development, bearing in mind internationally recognized principles on these matters. 
Furthermore, Members agree that labour standards shall not be used for protectionist trade 
purposes.”
In the 1990s, the number of regional preferential agreements increased dramatically. A sig-
nificant number of them are not “regional”, as the WTO terminology calls them, but concern 
distant partners such as Korea-Chile (2004) or USA-Morocco (2004). These agreements 
frequently include subjects not covered by WTO agreements, such as government procure-
ment, competition policies, foreign investment, and … labour standards.
NAFTA, which was ratified before the Singapore Conference, had introduced an additional 
agreement on labour, which is not anchored to ILO core labour standards but to national 
laws. Specific institutions are in charge of arbitrating disputes between countries and have 
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the power to impose sanctions (OECD [2000], Eliott [2001]). 
The US Trade Act of 2002 gives trade-negotiating objectives to the executive, the 6th objec-
tive being “to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with 
core labour standards of the ILO”. The 9th is “to promote universal ratification and full com-
pliance with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour”. The Trade Act creates special proce-
dures for Congressional approval of trade agreements. The President is required to prepare 
reports to the Congress setting out new free trade agreements (Eliott [2004]). 
In December 1998, Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay) adopted a 
social declaration about promotion and respect of ILO core labour standards. Similar provi-
sions can be found in most of the new regional trade agreements. 
What is feasible in bilateral agreements is not when a large number of parties is involved. 
Concerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the November 2002 Quito Ministerial 
Declaration confirms a disagreement between countries and the similar rift that existed 
amongst WTO members. 
In all the most recent EU trade agreements, such as the one signed with Chile, the Cotonou 
Partnership agreement with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries or the co-
operation agreement with South Africa, the recognition and promotion of social rights are 
integral parts of the agreements. EU bilateral free trade agreements make ILO’s standards a 
reference, not a matter of dispute. 
Developed countries also impose labour standards criteria within the Generalized System of 
Preference (GSP) and the WTO Enabling Clause, which allows non-reciprocal preferences 
in favour of developing countries. In the American trade law, the product and country eligi-
bility to GSP are restricted to the usual four core labour standards but also to “acceptable” 
working conditions with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety 
and health standards. The EU provisions are anchored to ILO core labour standards and 
GATT (article XX e) on prison labour. In case of violation, tariff preferences may be tempo-
rarily withdrawn for all or certain goods originating in a beneficiary country, as was the case 
against Burma. The EU also proposes “special incentive arrangements” for the protection of 
labour rights, which may be granted to countries whose national legislation incorporates the 
rules adopted in the ILO conventions. 
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V.  Why to include labour standards in trade agreements?
Many economists clearly agree that the improvement of core labour standards is a legitimate 
objective. However, they frequently consider that the introduction of these standards in trade 
agreements would be counter-productive. Two families of arguments are frequently put for-
ward: the targeting argument and the rent-seeking argument. Adversely, other economists 
consider the trade-labour linkage and the availability of labour standards as trade policy 
instruments. 
Anti: The targeting argument
To be efficient, a public intervention must aim as closely as possible at the distortion. This 
targeting reduces the counter-productive effects of the action (Bhagwati [2000], Baghwati & 
Hudec [1996]). Violation of core labour standards would mainly concern the non-export sec-
tor. Child and forced labour would first and foremost occur in domestic activities and small 
family firms. If international trade does not cause the violation of core labour standards, a 
social clause would add distortions to distortions.
However, the facts show that all tradable sectors witness violations of core labour standards. 
For example, child labour is relatively scarce in non-farm domestic labour (except in coun-
tries such as Ethiopia). Yet, major problems are located in the agricultural sector, which is 
highly exposed to international competition. Manufacturing and trade (including tourism) 
are also concerned, although to a lesser extent (Granger & Siroën, 2005). The trade-labour 
linkage could also be indirect through subcontracting between small companies in the non-
tradable sector and exporting firms. The former group may produce non-tradable services 
(guarding, maintenance, professional services) and indirectly contribute to the competitive-
ness of the exposed firms.
Many authors consider that Civic rights such as freedom of association and the right to 
organize and collective bargaining lead to higher wages in the formal sector, discourage 
foreign and domestic investment, hinder economic development, reduce the demand for the 
formal sector and thus lead to increased informality (Singh & Zammit [2000]. However, a 
recent econometric study finds that higher labour standards in 14 Latin American countries 
are correlated with a higher share of formal employment (Galli & Kucera [2004]). 
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Anti: The “rent-seeking“ argument
The introduction of a social clause into trade agreements would be a protectionist reac-
tion against low wage countries (Dasgupta [2000]). Economic theory, such as the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, confirms that opening trade to South countries, even favourable to the 
national real income, should harm the real income of unqualified labour, which is a relatively 
scarce factor in developed countries. The evolution is similar for the owners of specific 
factors located in the import sector (like land). Thus, North-South trade might propagate 
low wages from South to North. These negative effects would be worsened by violations 
of labour standards in exporting developing countries. Workers and specific factors’ own-
ers concerned by imports, may logically advocate protectionist measures and denounce the 
unfair competition from low labour standards countries. In fact, the AFL-CIO was one of 
the most activist organizations in defending the inclusion of social standards in internation-
al agreements, successfully in regional or bilateral agreements such as NAFTA. However, 
counter-lobbying from exporting and multinational firms counterbalances pressure from 
protectionist-organized groups. Ethical motivations and moral consciousness may override 
economic gains. Consumers themselves are frequently favourable to the inclusion of a social 
clause, even though they theoretically gain from lower import prices. 
Ambiguous: the trade-labour linkage argument 
Theoretically, violations of core labour standards exert two effects on trade flows. First of 
all, they decrease wages, thereby improving competitiveness. Secondly, child or forced la-
bour leads to an increase in the unskilled labour endowment. According to a Heckscher-
Ohlin analysis, this latter effect improves a developing country’s comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive goods and fosters exports. Both effects have the same result: low labour 
standards are pro-trade. However, this argument is not valid for all core labour standards 
since opposite effects on labour endowments theoretically occur with discrimination and 
possibly with trade union rights (Brown, Deardorff & Stern, 1993; Buss, 2002).
More  sophisticated  models  question  such  evidence,  emphasizing  other  effects  (Maskus 
[1997]). The child labour endowment may be counter-balanced by the eviction of substitut-
able adult labour (Grottaert & Kanbur, 1995). Basu & Van’s (1998) theoretical model leads 
to multiple equilibria in the labour market, with one case where children do not work and 
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adult wages are higher4. Moreover, the abolition of child labour does not necessarily imply 
a clear household income loss, insofar as it opens job opportunities for adults and may cause 
higher wages, to the extent that children and adults compete in labour markets. Abolition of 
child labour thus does not have clear and mechanical effects on household income, even in 
the short run (Basu [1999]).
More generally, violation of workers’ rights has to be analysed as a market imperfection, to 
the extent that the capacity of employees to conduct arbitrage between employers is denied 
by slavery practices or pressures exerted against children or their relatives. Violation of 
workers’ rights impedes labour mobility and favours monopsonistic practices by employers 
(Morici & Shulz (2001); Granger (2003); Shelburne (2004)). In such a situation, employers 
tend to reduce the demand for labour. For example, child labour restrained in agriculture 
might impede the development of exporting manufacturing industries. Moreover, higher 
exports might imply decreasing world prices and, as a result, negatively affect the terms of 
trade (Dehejia and Samy, 2004).
Pro: the trade policy argument
If violations of labour standards foster exports, they can be seen as a substitute for trade poli-
cies. Non-observance of labour standards in some industries or areas means keeping wage 
costs under their market price – i.e. marginal productivity – and the distortion should be con-
sidered as equivalent to an export or production subsidy. The only notable difference resides 
in the social “internal “ effects. Instead of being paid by domestic (rich) taxpayers, the sub-
sidy is borne by (poor) workers, which increases inequalities in the country. We can recall 
that subsidies are considered as actionable unfair and perturbing practices in the WTO. 
Another matter of concern is the “race-to-the-bottom” risk, which can be expressed as a clas-
sical “prisoner’s dilemma”. If a country does not respect core labour standards or undercuts 
them, other countries might be incited to lower their own standards to safeguard their com-
petitiveness. This non-cooperative game is thus “loser-loser” since the “deviating” country 
ends up losing its initial advantage, obtained by cheating. At the final equilibrium, all coun-
tries tend to apply sub-optimal labour standards because of inefficient inter-industrial alloca-
tions of factors and labour market distortions.
4  This multiple-equilibria outcome could be an argument for intervention in labour markets to reach the socially and economi- This multiple-equilibria outcome could be an argument for intervention in labour markets to reach the socially and economi-
cally preferred equilibrium. In another paper, Basu (2000) considers that minimum wages could plausibly cause some adults to 
be unemployed and send their children to work. However, he finds ambiguous results regarding the evolution of child labour 
when the adult minimum wage is raised (Basu, 2000).
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Core labour standards violations might also be used to encourage foreign direct investments 
(FDI), particularly inside free trade zones, where the government grants fiscal and legal 
exemptions (OECD [1996], [2000], Maskus [1997], Rodrik [1998]). 
In opposition with the rent-seeking argument, we may argue that multilateral labour stand-
ards drive to freer trade (Charnovitz [1994]). Violations of core labour standards are simul-
taneously perceived as unfair by firms and immoral by civil society, thus jeopardizing the 
legitimacy of multilateral free trade agreements and supporting the adoption of unilateral 
protectionist instruments. A social clause can be considered as an insurance against undesir-
able effects of trade openness and, specifically, the risk of external pressure to lower labour 
standards. For Bagwell and Staiger (1998), low labour standards could be the consequence 
of GATT rules, which are mainly concerned with tariff trade barriers. Negotiating countries 
must achieve balance between the level of standards and the level of tariffs. High customs 
duties might reflect higher cost associated with high labour standards. Moreover, if the coun-
tries could simultaneously negotiate labour standards and trade policy, the author’s model 
makes it possible to achieve zero customs duties equilibrium paired with a certain level 
of labour standards. However, negotiations on labour standards are excluded from WTO 
rounds, which lead to an inefficient theoretical outcome where positive customs duties are 
mixed with regressed labour standards.
VI. Empirical studies
Empirical research is rare and contradictory. Empirical observations are not conclusive 
about the reality of a “race-to-the-bottom” process. Studies frequently find that domestic 
or foreign exporting firms pay higher wages and usually respect labour standards better 
than local firms. Multinational firms would implement policies closer to the home country’s 
regulations than the practices in force in the host country. They would thereby contribute 
to raising standards (Moran [2002]). Other empirical studies show that countries with low 
labour standards are not attractive to FDI (Cooke and Noble [1998], Kucera [2002], Ray-
naud & Vidal [1998], Busse [2003], Busse & Braun [2003]). Rodrik (1998) finds a negative 
correlation between US FDI and child labour. 
Early studies showed the absence of correlation between labour standards and the volume of 
trade (OECD, [1996], [2000]; Mah [1997]) but they did not use reliable indicators of the real 
respect of labour standards. The number of ILO conventions ratified by a country is the most 
frequently used indicator in empirical studies (Rodrik [1998]; Busse [2003]; Cooke & Noble 
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[1998]). Because of a gap between the content of conventions and their effective application, 
this indicator must be considered with caution (Chau & Kanbur [2001]).
Rodrik (1998) shows that timework and child labour contribute to a higher share of labour-
intensive exports in total exports. Cees Van Beers (1998) finds that labour standards influ-
ence trade in 18 OECD countries. Granger (2005) has built her own indicators on the four 
core labour standards and concludes that their violation by Southern countries tends to raise 
the volume of North-South trade. These studies tend to confirm the existence of a trade-la-
bour linkage, and run contrary to the no-linkage hypothesis supported by many economists. 
So far, the question has been tackled from a unilateral point of view: do countries observing 
core labour standards trade more with the rest of the world?
However, trade relations concern couples of countries and are influenced by bilateral trade 
costs such as tariffs, as well as transport and insurance costs, which are specific to this bi-
lateral flow. Moreover, the observance of labour standards might influence these trade costs 
for various reasons. First, current-preferential agreement negotiations include provisions 
on labour standards. Following Bagwell & Staiger (1998), two respectful countries should 
conclude more reciprocal tariff reductions, which imply lower trade costs. Second, labour 
standards might also be considered as a proxy for many of the institutional determinants of 
trade which are democracy, rules of law, social stability, which could exert a positive impact 
on transaction costs and thus, on bilateral trade. Third, the respect of labour standards is 
costly and might impede exports, especially towards countries importing labour-intensive 
and high price-elasticity goods. Fourth, implementation of multinational firms in low-ranked 
countries to serve world and regional markets might be detrimental to trade between high-
ranked countries. 
Our empirical study aims to verify whether labour standards affect bilateral trade costs and 
the sign of this influence.
The best framework to discriminate between bilateral and unilateral influence of labour 
standards on bilateral trade is the Anderson and van Wincoop’s specification of the gravity 
model. Gravity models predict bilateral trade by the product of national incomes (GDP) and 
the distance between both partners, all these variables being expressed in natural logarithm. 
Distance is a proxy for transport costs and the model may be “augmented” by other variables 
affecting bilateral trade costs. The model proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
considers that income elasticity be estimated because theory fix it to 1. They also introduce 
country fixed effects (export and import), which capture all unilateral effects as level of 
development or remoteness. 
We have first estimated a basic gravity model with a given income elasticity and country 
fixed effects (Table 1 – column 1). Usual bilateral dummy variables as a common language, 
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a colonial tie, and a preferential trade agreement are also introduced in the model5. The 
estimations of this benchmark model are very consistent with the results found in literature 
(column 1). 
In a next step and in order to test the incidence of labour standards on trade, a bilateral 
synthetic indicator of core labour standards has been introduced in the benchmark model 
(Table 1 – column 2). Our indicator has been built from Granger’s database (2005) which 
separately scores the four core labour standards (child labour, forced labour, discrimination, 
union rights) from 1 (total violation) to 4 (total respect of the standard)6 and then gives two 
synthetic indicators of the effective respect of the four standards: the first one is a quantita-
tive variable, corresponding to a grading from 0 (no respect at all) to 1 (full respect); the 
second one is qualitative, corresponding to the classification in three groups (respect, partial 
respect and no respect).7 Annex 1 presents the indicator for the 63 countries in our sample as 
well as their classification into the three groups. Here, we use the qualitative indicator. 
Granger’s indicator is unilateral since it states the situation for a given country i. From this 
indicator, a bilateral one must be built to account for the situation in country i compared to 
the one in country j. Our bilateral indicator is defined as follows : LR1aij and LR0aij are 
dummy variables, respectively equal to 1 when both countries respect the standards and to 0 
when both countries are characterized either by partial or no respect). All other intermediate 
situations are used as a reference. 
Column (2) shows the results when these two dummy variables are introduced in the gravity 
model. Usual gravity variables are not affected. LR1aij and LR0aij have a significant and 
high coefficient, which is negative when countries respect labour standards and positive in 
the opposite case. The violation of labour standards increases bilateral trade! 
Some variants of this estimation have also been run. In column 3, the former labour standard 
variables are replaced by a less restrictive one. LR1bij and LR0bij are respectively quoted 
1 when both countries respect core labour standards even partially and 0 when they do not 
at all. Coefficients of these new variables have the same sign, which means that arbitrary 
choices made to rank countries do not influence conclusions. It has been seen that preferen-
tial agreements sometimes endorse labour rights provisions. For this reason, the inclusion 
of trade agreement variables with labour standards indicators might create instability. When 
trade agreements are withdrawn (column 4), results concerning labour rights remain unaf-
5    The existence of a common border between countries is not a significant variable in our sample of 63 countries.
6    The ranking is based on the exploitation of a large amount of qualitative and quantitative information from various sources, 
such as ILO, US Department of Labour, US Department of State, NGOs reports.
7    Since the methods used to build the quantitative indicator and the qualitative one are different, these two variables are not 
strictly identical. It would be interesting to compare the results obtained with each one.
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Independent variable Log(Xij/YiYj) a Log(Xij)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






















































































Log GDPi per capita h 0.17***
(0.03)
Log GDPj per capita h 0.10***
(0.03)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Constant -38.12*** -36.36*** -37.34*** -35.52*** -39.03*** -41.00***
Number of observations 3784 3784 3784 3784 3784 3784
Fisher’s statistic 40.14 39.72 40.02 37.08 39.42 1011.68
Root MSE 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.52
Adjusted R² 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.73
Table 1: The influence of core labour standards on bilateral trade (year 2000)
Note: ***, ** and * mean the coefficient is significant, respectively, at levels of 1, 5 and 10%. 
a Xij: FOB Bilateral exports from i to j, in U.S. current $, (IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics); Yi (Yj): Gross Domestic 
Products in U.S. current $ (World Bank, World Development Indicators). b Great arc circle kilometric distance be-
tween the two capitals of countries i and j (CEPII database). c : 1 if countries share the same language (CIA World 
Factbook).d 1 if countries have ever had a colonial link (CEPII database). e 1 if countries are members of a same 
trade agreement (WTO; Frankel, J.A., 1997. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Trading System. Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics; data collected by Cindy Duc). f Granger’s database (see text). g FH1ij (FH0ij): 
1 if two countries are democratic (autocratic) –i.e. their Freedom House’s indicator is greater (lower) than or equal 
to the median- (Freedom House). h Gross Domestic Product per capita in U.S. current $ (World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators).
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fected. Labour rights might also be a proxy for the nature and the quality of other institu-
tions. We introduce two more dummy variables: FH1ij when both countries are considered 
as democratic by Freedom House and FH0ij when both countries are considered as non-
democratic (situations where only one country is democratic and the other non-democratic 
must be interpreted as the reference situation). In this case as well, labour rights coefficients 
are very stable (column 5). The sign of democratic variables shows that democratic countries 
trade more, in spite of the fact that they usually have more respect for labour standards, yet 
coefficients are not significant. Column (6) tests a “traditional” model of gravity without 
country fixed effects and with estimated income elasticities. This equation without fixed 
effects also enables to introduce unilateral variables as GDP per capita. Income elasticities 
are very close to those predicted by theory. Even if coefficients are lower, they all maintain 
a significant good sign.
The four labour standards might have different influences on bilateral trade. We have con-
sequently replaced the synthetic indicator by ones specific to each standard. A country is 
considered as respecting a labour standard if it is scored 1 or 2 and not-respecting it for 3 
or 4. Table 2 gives coefficients when the equation (1) is augmented by variables indicating 
that both countries respectively respect each standard. Previous conclusions are roughly 
confirmed. 
Table 2: Specific influence of each core labour standards on bilateral trade (year 2000)
Coefficients from the equation (1) (table 1) augmented by each standard, separately taken. Data from Granger’s 
database (see text)
Note: ***, ** and * mean the coefficient is significant, respectively, at levels of 1, 5 and 10%. 
These results are ambiguous in terms of political implications. On the one hand, they support 
the Havana Charter negotiators, who affirmed the trade-labour linkage via the effect on ex-
ports. On the other hand, empirical evidence can reinforce the Singapore Declaration, which 
considers that a “level playing field” is a harmful constraint for trade and growth in develop-
ing countries. Would a sudden rise in labour standards definitively lead to a contraction of 
South exports and keep them out of the global world economy (Srinivasan [1996])? 
This idea is bedded in theoretical confusion. What is the objective: to foster exports or to 
increase income and development thanks to a factor reallocation? An optimal specializa-
Child Labour Forced Labour Discrimination Union rights
Respected  -0.92*** -1.11*** -0.86*** -0.83**
No respected 0.47 0.78** 0.51 0.61*
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tion based on comparative advantage principles does not mean a maximal volume of trade, 
which is a typical mercantilist prescription. Let us imagine two identical closed economies, 
which produce undifferentiated goods in a pure and perfect competition framework for all 
goods and factors, including labour. Because both economies bear exactly the same costs, 
the elimination of trade barriers does not create any trade. This optimal no-trade equilibrium 
is associated with the maximal income that both countries are able to earn. Now, let us as-
sume that inside one country, some employers have a monopsonistic power giving them the 
ability to reduce wages under the labour marginal productivity. In this country, a distorted 
comparative advantage appears in the monopsonistic sector, attracting factors from other 
sectors. A symmetric reallocation takes place in the other country. Thus, a distorted com-
parative advantage generates a sub-optimal specialization, which is trade-creating8.
VII.  Conclusion
The absence of reference to core labour standards in WTO official texts is explained by eco-
nomic diplomacy reasons, not by convincing economic or institutional arguments, because 
social clauses contribute to make labour markets more efficient as well as respect developing 
countries’ comparative advantages. 
Surprisingly, the Singapore Declaration has reinforced the ILO legitimacy. The organization 
gave a new lustre to fundamental conventions, which are now largely ratified by members 
and used as reference in many regional or trade agreements. It gave a mandatory statute to 
the 1998 Declaration. More cooperation between the ILO and the WTO is desirable, although 
the WTO dispute settlement body cannot base its decisions on ILO rules or expertise.
We have criticized the no trade-labour linkage assertion, which is not conform to theoretical 
and empirical evidence. Even if further studies have to be made, our first results shows that 
violations of labour-standards might improve exports. Consequently, low labour standards 
can be used as trade policy instruments to circumvent the WTO’s rules. 
Besides the social aspect of the issue, the stability of international trade relations should also 
be considered. A multilateral non-protectionist social clause could also prevent the risk of 
“social dumping” and “race-to-the-bottom”, which are plausible phenomena when countries 
do not frame their development by the enforcement of labour laws, as developed countries 
did a century ago. 
8  Symmetrically, on the supply-side, a trade-union monopolist would create distorted comparative disadvantages in intensive-
intensive productions. This might be the case in “populist” countries like Mexico or Argentina. 
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The most important issue may be that the absence of a social clause or an explicit recognition 
of labour rights in the WTO contributes to weakening and jeopardizing the free trade multilat-
eral system. Ignoring the trade-labour linkage in the WTO provides an incentive to deal with 
the issue outside the organization, contributes to the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements, and stresses the decay of the most-favoured nation principle as well. 
In a recent work, Kimberly Ann Elliott (2004) defends possible complementarities between 
development, globalisation and core labour standards. She assesses that: “Globalisation is not 
leading to a worldwide race to the bottom for workers, but greater respect for the core labour 
standards could help spread its benefits more broadly”. This seems a positive way to think 
about the core labour issue.
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IX.  Annex 1: Core Labor Standards Indicator
Total respect (29) Partial Respect (13) No Respect (23)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria 
Canada
Czech 
Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hongkong 
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands 
New-Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Algeria
Chili
Colombia
Ecuador
Israel
Korea 
Mexico
Russian Federation
Singapore
South Africa
Sri Lanka 
Tunisia
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Brazil
China
Côte d’Ivoire 
Dominican 
Republic 
Egypt 
India
Indonesia
Iran
Kenya
Malaysia
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan 
Peru
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Thailand
Turkey
United Arab 
Emirates
Viet Nam
Zimbabwe
Source: Granger (2005)
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